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Abstract:  Market integration raises the relative price of a community’s export product.  This 
study examines how the response of child labor supply to an increase in the relative price of a 
primary export product varies with a child’s household composition.  The specific context for 
this study is the liberalization of rice markets in Vietnam in the 1990s.  Between 1993 and 1998, 
Vietnam lifted export restrictions on rice, allowing the domestic price to rise toward international 
levels, and eliminated internal restrictions on the flow of rice between regions of Vietnam.  Thus, 
the relative price of rice increased overall in Vietnam, but the degree of price change varied 
across communities with the lifting of restrictions on internal flows.  This study finds that the 
response of child labor supply to rice price increases is increasing the amount of time children 
work.  Thus, household composition attributes that are associated with higher levels of child 
labor are also associated with larger declines in child labor with rice price increases.  The results 
are consistent with girls particularly benefiting from product market integration, because they 
work more than boys do.  These results suggest that economic factors associated with economic 
reform may attenuate differences in the activities of siblings that are typically associated with 
cultural traditions and norms. 
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  A key foundation of the so-called "Washington Consensus" is that the free flow of goods 
across national and international markets is critical to affect economic growth and improve 
household welfare.  Generally speaking, there appears to be strong evidence that there are large 
gains from trade to be had by national and international market integration and that these gains 
from trade in some cases may be widely distributed across households (Collier and Dollar 2002).  
There is, however, little evidence on how the gains from national and market integration are 
distributed across children within the household.  The aim of this study is to consider how the 
relationship between product market integration and child labor supply varies with household 
composition. 
  This study begins with a simple theoretical model that generates variation in the effect of 
market integration on child labor depending on the relative productivity of household members.  
Product market integration leads to relative price shifts for the liberalized commodity, and in the 
model where household members differ in their productivities in production, children who are 
relatively more productive experience larger changes in their labor supply with a change in 
relative prices.  For example, a 25 year old is likely a more productive farm worker than is a 10 
year old.  As a result, equilibrium in household time allocation implies that the 10 year old ends 
up working relatively less and thereby will tend to experience a smaller decline in labor supply if 
market integration affects a decline in work among children.  If instead of a 25 year old, the 10 
year old worked with a 6 year old, then the 10 year old would work relatively more than when 
the 25 year old was present.  Thus, when the effect of market integration is to diminish labor 
supply, there is scope for a greater effect on the labor supply of the 10 year old.  In this way, the 
effect of market integration on child labor can depend on household composition.    2
The empirical context of this paper is Vietnam's liberalization of its rice markets during 
the 1990s.  Between 1993 and 1998, the real price of rice increased on average by almost 30% 
relative to a consumer price index in Vietnam.  Brandt and Benjamin (2004) show that 
international and national rice market integration are driving forces behind these rice price 
changes.  In 1989, out of a concern for domestic food security, Vietnam imposed stringent export 
controls on its rice exports.  Coupled with internal restrictions on the flow of rice across regions, 
these trade restrictions suppressed the domestic price of rice and lowered the relative incomes of 
rice producing households.  However, from 1993 to 1998, the government gradually liberalized 
its export regime, increasing the quota from less than 1 million metric tons in 1992 to 4.5 million 
in 1998.  The rise in international demand from the relaxation of the quota will put upward 
pressure on domestic prices of rice.  In addition, the government lifted internal barriers to rice 
trade across regions within Vietnam in early 1997, beginning the integration of the national 
market for rice.    National integration leads to relative price shifts with rice surplus areas 
experiencing larger price increases than rice deficit areas.   
The empirical approach of this study is to relate regional and intertemporal variation in 
the relative price of rice to variation in child labor using rural, panel households from the 
Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS).  The VLSS is a multi-purpose household survey with 
community-level price surveys conducted in 1993 and 1998.  This study captures sibling and 
household composition effects by allowing the effect of rice prices to vary with household and 
sibling composition.  Of course, not all of the variation in rice prices observed in the data is 
attributable to national and international product market integration.  However, to the extent that 
market integration leads to relative price variation, the results of this study suggest effects that 
could result from a market integration that induces a similar degree of price variation.  In fact,   3
there is a long tradition within international economics of examining how factors such as adult 
labor supply respond to relative price movements within a country (e.g. Leamer and Levinsohn 
1995).  The reason for this is summarized by Krugman (1991): "One of the best ways to 
understand how the international economy works is to start looking at what happens inside 
nations ... The data will be better and pose fewer problems of compatibility, and the underlying 
economic forces will be less distorted by government policies."  
The next section of this paper outlines the theoretical model.  Section 3 introduces the 
data, and section 4 develops the empirical specification.  Section 5 presents the results.  The 
empirical results of this study are largely consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model.  
Children that work more prior to liberalization experience large reductions in child labor supply 
with rice price increases.  This appears to be because on average, increasing relative prices of 
rice are associated with declines in child labor and sibling differences in productivity amplify the 
effect of rice price increases for more productive children.  Section 6 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Context 
This section develops a simple theoretical model that allows child labor to depend on 
household and sibling composition.  It first considers how child labor supply responds to 
increases in rice prices (following Edmonds and Pavcnik 2003a), then how this response varies 
with household and sibling composition.  The model in this section is built on two salient 
features of child labor and rice production.  First, almost all child labor in Vietnam takes place 
inside the child's own household.  Of children that participate in any economic activity in 
Vietnam in 1993, 97 percent do so only within their own household.  Second, most households in 
Vietnam are exposed to rice price increases through both consumption (44 percent of food   4
expenditure is on rice in 1993) and production (98 percent of all communities in Vietnam 
produced rice in 1993). 
Households can produce two goods: rice (r) and a nonagricultural good (n).  Define p as 
the relative price of rice:  r n p pp = .  The aim of this section is to show how the effect of 
changes in p on child labor depends on household composition.  Assume there are two types of 
workers in the household indexed 1 and 2.  This section's discussion is framed as if both of these 
prospective workers are children although one worker could be viewed as a child and the other as 
an adult in order to extend this section's results to more the more general household composition 
question.    Child 2’s labor is a perfect substitute for a units of labor type 1.  That is, total child 
labor used in production is L=L1+aL2.  When a<1, child 1 is more productive than child 2. 
There are a number of possible explanations for differences in productivity between 
children.  Edmonds (2002) argues that differences in child labor associated with birth order can 
be explained by the fact that older children are better workers in most types of economic 
activities.  Gender may also play a role in generating differences in productivity if there are 
certain agricultural tasks where males are more capable.  Behrman and Taubman (1986) 
highlight a number of psycho-social reasons for differences between children associated with 
birth order.  For example, older children grow up in a more adult environment.  Thus, their 
behavior is closer to adult behavior, and they are more productive.  Of course, it is not 
necessarily the case that older siblings are more productive.  Later born children may have 
wealthier parents because of life-cycle earnings profiles.  Coupled with the earnings of lower 
birth order children, this may improve the quality of human capital investments in higher birth 
order children (Willis and Parish 1993) and mean less child labor for younger children (Emerson 
and Portela 2002).  Ejrnæs and Pörtner (2000) argue that the presence of higher birth order   5
children signals that the latent ability of lower birth order children is low.  Their idea is that 
parents only decide to have additional children if their first draw is less able than expected.  
Birdsall (1991) argues that mother's time is a critical input into the productivity of children and 
that a mother has the least time to invest in middle children.  Hence, ex-ante the link between 
birth order and productivity is not clear.  However, in the empirical work below, older children 
appear more productive.  Hence, the discussion in this section follows with the assumption that 
older children are more productive than their younger co-residents. 
Household income depends on its use of land K and labor L as well as the relative price 
of rice p.  Each household is treated as a small enterprise that employs both factors of production 
and trades neither.  Land is assigned to the household, so the household’s problem is to choose 
how much of each type of labor it uses.  Aggregate household income is given by the profit 
function:  (, ,) I GpKL ≡  with Gp>0, Gk>0, GL>0, Gpp>0, Gkk<0 and GLL<0.  The main focus of 
the empirical work is on how household or sibling composition interacts with rice prices in 
affecting child labor supply.  Thus, in the discussion of this section, adult labor supply is implicit 
in the profit function, and the household’s problem is to decide how much of child 1 and child 
2’s labor to use.  Nevertheless, this section’s theoretical results can be applied to the household 
composition empirical results if labor types are reinterpreted as referring to child and non-child 
labor. 
  The profit function defines the household’s demand for each type of child labor.  Child 1 
receives a (shadow) wage that is the value of its marginal product in the household profit 
function:  11 2 (, , ) L wG p K La L ≡+ .  This is the inverse demand function for child 1’s labor in the 
household's production problem.  Similarly, define  21 2 (, , ) L wa G p K L a L ≡ + .     6
Household welfare depends on household consumption of rice and non-agricultural goods 
as well as the amount that each child works:  { } 12 , LL .  Child labor is a bad in household 
preferences.  Let household preferences with respect to the labor supply of each child, be 
represented by the indirect utility function: 
(1)  12 11 22 (,, , ) ( ) () ( )
()
I
vpILL u hL h L
p β
=− −     
where ( ) p β  is the price index, u is increasing and concave (i.e. u'>0, u''<0), and  i h  is increasing 





≡ .  This set-up in (1) 
assumes separability between consumption and child labor, separability between the disutility of 
having each child work, and homotheticity of preferences over consumption goods.  
 Allowing  h to vary across children permits the household to feel differently about the 
labor supply of child 1 and child 2.  When a child is not working, it may be enjoying leisure, 
play, or perhaps attending school.  Hence, h embodies how the household values the return to 
any of these activities.  h may differ across children because of parental preferences over 
children, differences in the actual or perceived returns to schooling, social customs, etc.  This 
may be particularly important in understanding gender differences in child labor.  Parish and 
Willis (1993) emphasize social norms as an important reason for why eldest girls tend to support 
the family more than other siblings in Taiwan.  Emerson and Portela (2002) find a similar result 
in Brazil.  These eldest girls would have a different h in this model.   
The child labor supply function for each child (i) follows out of the household's 
optimization problem: 
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Coupled with the equilibrium in labor demand ( 12 aw w = ), these labor supply functions imply 
that the negative of the marginal rate of substitution between the labor child one and two equals 
the inverse of a or equivalently: 
(2)  () ()
''
11 22 ah L h L = . 
Because of the assumptions on h, the more productive child 1 works more than the less 
productive child 2.  The solution to the household's problem is to equate child labor supply with 











    
and is an implicit function of market prices, family resources, and tastes. 
To consider how a movement in the relative price of rice affects the labor supply of child 
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The household’s equilibrium relationship between the labor supply of each child , eq. (2), 
determines how the labor supply of child 1 changes with a change in the labor supply of child 2.  











=    8
That is, how the labor supply of child 2 moves with changes in the labor supply of child 1 
depends on their relative productivities and the household’s preferences over the labor supply of 
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.   1 ∆ is positive by 
assumption ( 11 ' 0, '' 0, ' 0, '' 0, 0, 0 LL L hhu u G G >> > >>< ).  Note 
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.  The derivative of the profit function with respect to the price 
















 where  ( ) ds myy ≡ −  is the household's net consumption of rice.  
Plugging in yields an expression for how child labor responds to a change in the relative price of 
rice: 
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This emphasizes three ways in which child labor may decline with an increase in the 
relative price of rice.  The first term of (5) denotes the pure substitution effect on the production 
side toward or away from child labor.  The pure substitution effect in production is positive if 
rice production is child labor intensive.  That is, as rice prices increase, children may be drawn to   9
work more in rice production.  However, rice production might not be child labor intensive 
relative to household production.  In this case, increases in rice prices may draw other workers 
into rice production, causing a decline in child work in rice production.  Thus, the pure 
substitution effect in production may be positive or negative depending on the relative intensity 
of child labor in rice production.  The second term is the pure substitution effect in consumption 
away from rice toward child leisure.  When rice prices increase, the price index β(p) increases.  
Thus,  ''' ( ) hu R β is positive.  Hence, as a result of increasing rice prices, equilibrium in the 
household causes the household to consume more of the relatively cheaper child leisure.  The last 
term is the terms of trade or net income effect for the household.  If the household is a net 
importer of rice (m>0), then this term unambiguously leads to an increase in child labor.  If the 
household is a net exporter of rice (i.e. m<0), then the net income effect of an increase in the 
price of rice is to reduce child labor.  Overall, then, the net effect of a rice market liberalization 
induced increase in the relative price of rice is ambiguous.   
In order to understand how the effect of rice prices varies with sibling composition, first 
consider the case where there is no sibling (a=0).   1 ∆  is smaller in the absence of siblings.  
Hence, the labor supply of the child (for a given marginal disutility of labor) is more responsive 
to price changes in the absence of siblings.  The intuition behind this is that the benefits or costs 
of rice price increases are spread over children.  Without siblings, there are no children to share 
the benefits or spread the costs of rice price increases with.  Of course, the marginal disutility of 
labor may be different in the presence of siblings so diminished sensitivity to price changes in 
the presence of siblings is not a general result. 
In order to understand how the effect of rice prices on child labor supply depends on the 
relative productivity of siblings, it is helpful to consider how the response of child 1’s labor   10
supply to a price change varies with a small change in a.  To consider this, take the partial 
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The term in parenthesis is negative, so the effect of a change in a on how rice prices affect child 
labor depends on the sign of the net effect of rice prices on child labor.  If rice prices increase 
child labor supply, then an improvement in the productivity of child 2 mitigates the amount that 
the relatively productive child 1’s labor supply has to increase.  This is because the improvement 
in child 2's productivity leads child 2 to bear more of the necessary increase in work while 
incurring less disutility for the household (it costs child 2 less actual labor units).  If rice price 
increases decrease child labor, then an increase in the productivity of a sibling means that child 
1’s decline in child labor will be relatively less, because child 1 contributes less labor initially.   
  The discussion in this section has been focused on the case where both workers are 
children.  The basic result for how household composition induces variation in how child labor 
responds to price changes is that when a child is relatively more productive, the child works 
more, and thereby can experience larger declines in child labor if price increase lead to a decline 
in child labor.  This result generalizes to the case of one adult and one child instead of the two 
child workers considered explicitly in this section so long that the adult and child labor are 
perfect substitutes in production after an equivalence adjustment.  For example, the results of this 
section suggest if an older adult is present instead of a younger sibling, then the child works less 
before the price increase and thereby experiences a smaller decline in work with the increase in 
prices.  How realistic is this assumption that that adult and child labor are perfect substitutes after 
an equivalence adjustment?  This assumption is commonplace in the theoretical literature on   11
child labor (e.g. Basu and Van 1998), and there is surprisingly little evidence against the 
assumption (see Levison and others (1998) for an example and discussion).  Thus, the discussion 
in this section is applicable to the more general household composition case in addition to the 
sibling comparison case that is considered explicitly. 
3.  Data Description 
The relationship between product prices in the rice sector and the economic activities of 
household members is investigated using two rounds of the Vietnam Living Standards Survey 
(VLSS) that span the period of rice market liberalizations.  The first round of the VLSS was 
conducted between September 1992 and October 1993.  The second round of the VLSS revisited 
147 communes from the first round between December 1997 and December 1998.  This study 
focuses on households in the 115 revisited rural communes and is not limited to panel 
households that are interviewed in both rounds of the survey.  The sample is limited to rural 
households, because rural households have the potential to be exposed to price changes on both 
the consumption and the production side.  Hence, they should display all of the mechanisms 
discussed in the previous section.  The household survey includes questions on household 
composition, the labor activities of adults and children, education, expenditure, land holdings, 
and agricultural activities.  The household survey is accompanied by a community questionnaire 
that includes detailed price information. 
3.1 Rice Prices 
This paper relates changes in the price of rice to changes in the economic activities 
children, allowing the association between rice price changes and child labor to vary with sibling 
and household composition.  Thus an overview of the observed rice price changes is important to 
understand identification.  The price of rice is deflated with the monthly consumer price index so   12
that all prices are in 1998 (January) Dong.  The price deflator does not vary by region.  Thus, the 
variation in real rice prices observed in the data stems from movements in rice prices rather than 
the price index.  The mean rice price in 1993 was 2,600 dong per kilogram of ordinary rice 
(author's calculation from the 1992/93 Vietnam Living Standards Survey).  One U.S. dollar 
corresponds to approximately 14,000 Dong in 1998, so the price of rice in 1993 is approximately 
19 cents per kilogram.  The average domestic price of ordinary rice increases by 28% relative to 
the rise in the consumer price index between 1993 and 1998 to approximately 24 cents per 
kilogram (author's calculation using the 1997/98 Vietnam Living Standards Survey).  
Benjamin and Brandt (2004) describe the sources of rice price variation in greater detail.  
They highlight two reasons for why rice prices rise.  First, the increase in the overall level of 
prices may be attributable to the decline in the rice export quota that took place during the 1990s.  
Out of a concern for domestic food security, Vietnam implemented a rice export quota in the late 
1980s in order to suppress the domestic price of rice.  During the time of the data, Vietnam 
gradually liberalized the quota so that by 1997, it was no longer binding.  The lifting of the quota 
may lead to asymmetric price changes if communities vary in their exposure to the effects of 
lifting the quota.  This may occur if there are important transport costs that are a function of the 
value of the rice being exported out of the exporting community or if the transport costs are on 
the quantity of rice exported which is in turn associated with the baseline price. 
The second major source of rice price variation across communities is Vietnam’s lifting 
of restrictions on the flow of rice across communities in 1997.  Prior to 1997, communities that 
would become rice exporters in 1998 received relatively lower prices than rice importers.  The 
easing of restrictions on the flow of rice across communities, then allowed price changes that are 
largest in the net exporting regions.  Overall, though, there does not appear to be national   13
convergence, so both the integration of domestic markets and the rice export quota are likely 
responsible for the price changes that are exploited in this study. 
3.2 Household and Sibling Composition 
The aim of this empirical work is to relate rice prices movements to changes in child 
labor supply allowing the effects to vary based on household and sibling composition.  In the 
analysis, this study focuses on households with children 6-15 in the 115 rural communes that are 
visited in both rounds of the VLSS.  Age 6 is chosen as a lower bound, because the VLSS does 
not collect data on the activities of children below 6.  15 is the upper bound following convention 
on many international treaties on child labor.  This restriction leads to 2,255 households in 1993 
and 2,375 households in 1998.  The increase in sample size in part reflects a decision on the part 
of the General Statistical Office of Vietnam to increase the sample size between rounds of the 
VLSS as well as a rise in the number of children ages 6-15.  Table 1 summarizes household and 
sibling composition in 1993 and 1998 for the nationally representative VLSS samples and the 
restricted sample of households with children 6-15 in rural panel communes used in the analysis.   
Unsurprisingly, households with children tend to be larger than average.  Likewise rural 
households have more children than do urban households.  Thus, household size is 
approximately half a person larger in the study sample than in the nationally representative 
dataset. 
  Overall household size is smaller in 1998 than in 1993.  This is true in the nationally 
representative sample and in the selected sample of rural households with children in panel 
communes.  The decline in household size between years is about half a person.  Most of the 
decline is in children under 5.  The onset of economic reform in Vietnam in 1986 is associated 
with a large decline in fertility that is associated with a significant increase in the average age of   14
the population.  There appears to be a second, even larger decline in fertility accompanying 
economic reforms in the mid 1990s.   
  The bottom panel of table 1 summarizes certain household composition averages for 
children 6-15 that can differ across children within the same household (the top panel does not).  
Most children have both parents present, although fathers are slightly more likely to be absent 
than are mothers.  The probability that a child resides with a parent (individually or jointly) 
increases between 1993 and 1998, but these changes are not statistically significant.      
  A sibling in this study is defined as a co-resident individual of any age that shares at least 
one parent in common with the child.  In counting siblings, the reference child is not counted.  
Thus, the average child 6-15 in 1993 has 3.3 other people living in the same household with at 
least one parent in common.  The average child 6-15 in 1998 has 2.7 co-residents that share a 
parent.  The row "fraction brothers" displays the fraction of all siblings that are male.  The sex 
distribution of siblings is fairly equal.  The fraction of siblings that are male increases slightly in 
1998, but the change is not statistically significant.  The row "fraction younger" contains the 
fraction of siblings that are younger than the reference child.  For the children 6-15 examined in 
this study, their average sibling is older, and the share of siblings that are older increases between 
1993 and 1998.  This rise in the share of siblings that are older is to be expected given the 
decline in fertility that occurs in Vietnam between 1993 and 1998. 
  An obvious concern in this study is that household composition may also adjust in 
reaction to price changes.  Edmonds, Mammen, and Miller (2003) document changes in 
household composition associated with changes in household income in South Africa.  Shifts in 
household composition could affect child labor supply in ways that do not follow directly from 
the mechanisms through which rice price increases affect child labor supply that section 2   15
describe.  For example, rice price increases may cause large landholding households to desire 
more labor.  In the presence of labor market imperfections, increased labor may spur the 
household to import more labor directly into the household.  In turn, changes in household labor 
could affect the allocation of child time.  This type of mechanism for changes in child labor 
supply is not captured in the theoretical framework of section 2.  However, it may be an 
important part of the reduced form effect of rice price changes.  Hence, the empirical work in the 
next section will not attempt to separately identify the various income and substation effects 
described in the previous section.  Rather, they serve as motivation for why rice price increases 
might affect child labor.  Shifts in household composition may be an additional mechanism. 
3.3 Child Labor 
  In general, there are large changes in child labor occurring in Vietnam in the 1990s 
(Edmonds and Turk 2004).  Table 2 summarizes by gender and year the changes in child labor 
that occur in the sample of rural households in communes that are visited in both rounds of the 
VLSS.  Throughout this study, the focus is on children 6-15.  The top panel of table 2 contains 
participation rates in various activities in the last 7 days.  Wage work consists of work for pay (in 
cash or in kind) outside of the child's household in agricultural or non-agricultural activities.  
Within the household, the VLSS collects data on participation in the family's farming activities 
(labeled "agriculture"), the family's non-farm home enterprise, and household production.  
Participation in household production is asked in a single question that defines household 
production as domestic duties, home repair and household maintenance, time spent working on 
agricultural tools, caring for animals, fetching water, and collecting firewood.  Participation in 
each category of activity (wage work, own farm agriculture, home enterprise, household 
production) is asked directly in the questionnaires and the questions in the survey instrument are   16
identical in both rounds of the VLSS.  Moreover, these categories are not mutually exclusive.  A 
child may respond that she participates in all of them as well as none of them. 
  Three constructed variables in the top panel of table 2 measure child participation in a 
combination of these activities.  Market work indicates participation in wage work or work 
inside the household in agriculture or a home enterprise.  Any work indicates participation in 
market work or household production.  Much of this study's analysis focuses on the participation 
measure labeled "active."  A child is active if she participates in market work of spends 7 or 
more hours in the last 7 days in household production.   
This participation measure "active" corresponds to the definition of child labor employed 
by the International Labor Organization in many of its SIMPOC country studies.  This study uses 
the word "active" instead of child labor in order to avoid argument over how to define child 
labor.  Instead "child labor" is understood to refer broadly to the set of activities (other than 
schooling) described in table 2.  Many studies of the activities of children tend to focus on 
market work alone (for examples, see the studies collected in Grootaert and Patrinos 1999).  In 
the present context, some of the aspects of the household production question fall within the 
ILO's official definition of "economically active", so the household production data should not 
neglected even if domestic duties were not of substantive interest.  Moreover, the consideration 
of time in household production overcomes three main conceptual problems that arise in studies 
that from failing to consider the activities performed by children in the production of nontradable 
goods (home production).  First, when a child works outside of its household as a paid domestic 
servant or a slave that child is classified as a child laborer under the most stringent of definitions.  
Reclassifying the child's production activities as something other than work if the child's 
employer changes (even if it changes to a parent) seems arbitrary.  Second, treating the   17
production of nontradables as "not-working" makes it difficult to interpret the meaning of the 
state of "not working."  For example, if home production is ignored in the definition of child 
labor, a child that stops limited work in a family business to take over extensive household 
responsibilities (say, because of the absence of a parent) would appear to stop working.  Third, 
an assertion that child participation in the production of nontradables is not an economic 
phenomenon (or of economic interest) implies that including home production in a definition of 
child labor should attenuate any findings.  To the extent that participation in the production of 
nontradables varies with changes in the relative price of a market good, it clearly is of economic 
importance. 
The bottom panel of table 2 summarizes hours worked per week in wage work and within 
household work.  The two constructed hours worked measures are market work (the sum of wage 
work, own farm work, and household enterprise work) and total hours (the sum of market work 
and work in household production).  While the participation questions are identical in both 
rounds of the VLSS, there is dramatic change in the way that information on hours in own-farm 
work is collected. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2003b) discuss how this change in questionnaire may 
introduce bias into the discussion of how rice price changes are related to hours worked in 
agriculture, market work, and total hours.  Thus, the focus of the analysis in this paper is largely 
on participation.  Hours worked results will be presented in tandem with the caveat that there is 
good reason to believe that there may be considerable bias in changes in hours worked in 
agriculture. 
Two aspects of child labor in Vietnam in the 1990s are evident in table 2.  First, girls tend 
to work more than boys.  Girls have higher participation rates in each category of work in both 
rounds of the VLSS with the exception of non-agricultural wage work in 1998 and home   18
enterprise work in 1998.  Most of the gender differences in participation are small in size and 
statistically insignificant.  The one category where the difference in participation is large and 
statistically significant is work in household production.  This translates into significant 
differences in participation in work within the household, any work, active, and active without 
school.  Similarly, average hours worked in household production are also different between 
genders.  Girls work on average 2.9 more hours per week in 1993 and 1.8 more hours per week 
in 1998 in household production.  Coupled with the slightly higher hours worked per week by 
girls in activities other than wage work (where hours worked are equal), girls end up working a 
total of 3.4 more hours per week in 1993 and 2.2 more hours per week in 1998. 
Second, both boys and girls experience large declines in child labor between 1993 and 
1998.  Participation in every type of work declines between 1993 and 1998 with the exception of 
participation in household production which increases slightly for boys and does not decline for 
girls.  Aside from hours worked in nonagricultural wage work for boys which does not change, 
average hours worked declines in every type of work in table 2.  The magnitudes of the changes 
in participation rates for each category of work are roughly similar for boys and girls.  Girls 
experience a slightly larger decline in own-farm work and home enterprise work, but these 
differences are not statistically significant.  However, the consequence of slightly larger declines 
in own-farm and home enterprise work for girls is that gender differences participation rates are 
generally smaller in 1998 than in 1993.  Gender differences in hours work also converge, 
because girls experience similar or slightly larger (but never statistically significant) changes in 
hours worked than experienced by boys.  In percentage terms, both boys and girls experience a 7 
percent decline in participation in work within the household and a 20 percent decline in children 
who are "active". Total hours worked decline for both genders by approximately 25 percent.   19
  Table 3 previews the relationship between household composition and children being 
active.  Children 6-15 in 1993 and 1998 are pooled together in table 3.  Column 1 summarizes 
the household composition variables described in the context of table 1 for children who are 
active and column 2 provides household composition summary statistics for children who are not 
active.  The children 6-15 that are analyzed in this study are included in household composition 
measures such as the number of persons 6-15 in the households although they are not included in 
sibling counts (as in Table 1).  Some of the relationships between child labor and household 
composition evident in table 3 are important in the discussion below.  First, children that work 
tend to have fewer young adults (16 to 24) and prime-age adults (25-64) although these 
differences are small and not statistically significant.  Second, working children tend to have 
more co-resident siblings.  These additional siblings are disproportionately younger, especially 
younger brothers.  The results below indicate that child labor increases in the number of younger 
siblings, especially if those siblings are brothers.  The effect of rice prices on child labor then 
varies with this attributes.  Adding younger siblings increases the decline in child labor 
associated with rice price increases, but if these younger siblings are brothers more than sisters, 
the decline in child labor with rice price increases is mitigated. 
4. Identification of Household Composition Effects 
  The empirical approach of this paper is to relate these changes in child labor to changes 
in rice prices, allowing the coefficient on rice prices to vary with household and sibling 
composition.  This study does not aim to explain the source of variation in rice price increases 
across communities.  There are any number of reasons aside from market integration for relative 
price shifts although Benjamin and Brandt (2004) argue that the easing of the rice export quota 
and the lifting of internal restrictions on the flow of rice across regions are the primary drivers   20
behind rice price movements.  This study's purpose is to consider how relative price movements 
affect changes in child labor supply, because market integration leads to relative price shifts.  
Thus, even if market integration is not behind the observed price movements, the link between 
price movements and child labor supply can still inform about the effect of market integration on 
child labor supply. 
  However, this approach of linking child labor supply to price variation raises several 
concerns.  Namely, any number of local economic factors may be associated with both rice price 
movements and child labor supply movements but have nothing to do with the causal effect of 
rice price changes on child labor supply.  This section begins with a description of some of the 
more problematic confounding factors, describes how the empirical framework attempts to 
control for them, and ends with a discussion of some of the remaining problems that the 
empirical work cannot address.  This discussion is largely based on Edmonds and Pavcnik 
(2003c).  That study is devoted to the question of whether the relationship between price 
movements and child labor supply is driven by omitted factors correlated with price movements 
and child labor that have nothing to do with the causal effect of rice price movements on child 
labor.  They find that the relationship between changes in rice prices and child labor supply is 
extremely robust.  Even when they control for observable factors that can account for over 90 
percent of the variation in rice prices, they find a response of child labor supply to price 
movements that is nearly identical to that observed without controlling for factors that might be 
associated with rice price movements. 
4.1 Likely Sources of Spurious Correlation 
  Sources of spurious correlation between price movements and child labor supply can be 
grouped into two general categories: time invariant and time varying attributes.   21
  The most obvious time invariant attribute is that rice prices in part reflect characteristics 
of a local community.  Some communities may have a large number of consumers relative to 
producers.  In autarky, that community will have high rice prices.  Alternatively, a community 
may have land that is suited towards rice production.  In that case, supply may large relative to 
demand and autarky prices will be low.  Thus, with integration, price movements may be 
correlated with latent supply and demand factors and it is not difficult to imagine why these 
supply and demand factors may also be correlated with child labor supply.  Any number of other 
community attributes may be important to both rice prices and child labor.  For example, the 
economic activities of households and rice prices might vary across communes because 
communes differ in the availability of schooling, labor market conditions, land and resource 
endowments, and integration into the Vietnamese economy.  Together, these unobserved 
commune characteristics would bias estimates of the effect of rice prices on participation in 
economic activities.  However, the panel nature of the data permits the inclusion of commune 
fixed effects in all regressions to control for time-invariant commune characteristics.  Within 
communities, there may be unobserved heterogeneity in households that is correlated with both 
rice prices and labor market participation.  However, since the effect of rice prices on child labor 
is identified with community*time variation in rice prices, household heterogeneity is unlikely to 
generate bias.  
  Time varying community attributes that may generate a spurious correlation between rice 
price movements and child labor are somewhat more difficult to deal with.  First, unobserved 
economy-wide time shocks that could affect the probability a person works and rice prices are 
controlled for with a year indicator that is one if the survey year is 1997/98 (1992/93 is the 
omitted year).  Second, rice price changes vary differentially across Vietnamese regions (see   22
Benjamin and Brandt 2004).  At the same time, different regions might have implemented 
differential policy changes and infrastructure improvements during the sample.  Or, labor 
mobility across regions might be limited, which could lead to variation in the changes in the 
returns to schooling across regions.  These unobserved region-specific time-varying shocks could 
result in spurious correlation between rice prices and economic activities.  These concerns 
however can be addressed by interacting each region indicator with a year indicator.
1  Third, 
Vietnamese communes differ in their accessibility.  If more accessible communes are better 
integrated into international and national rice markets, these communes might undergo bigger 
rice price changes.  Similarly, accessibility might be associated with a range of time-varying 
factors affecting labor supply.  The VLSS provides information on whether regular 
transportation is provided to a commune and whether the road to commune is paved.  Based on 
this information, two indicator variables for a communes’ accessibility are constructed and 
interacted with the year indicator.  Inclusion of these two interactions in the empirical framework 
allows for a different change in economic activities in accessible communes.  Fourth, 
communities are interviewed at different times of the year in each round of the survey.  This 
might generate a spurious correlation between changes in child labor and rice prices due to 
seasonality.  For example, rice prices may be low in harvest season and demand for child labor 
high.  Rice prices may be high in off-season and demand for child labor low.  Thus, a regression 
of rice prices on child labor would merely capture the fact that different communities are 
interviewed at different times.  In the empirical work, this can be controlled for by the inclusion 
of season indicators, an indicator for whether the interview took place at a rice harvest, and an 
indicator for whether an interview took place at rice planting time control for seasonal variation. 
4.2 Empirical Framework 
                                                 
1 There are 4 to 35 sampled communes per region (the mean and the median are both 25 communes per region).   23
The empirical approach follows directly out of these concerns.  For a child j in commune 
i at time t, the following is estimated: 
(6)  01 2 1 2 1 2 3 ** . ijt it it jt jt jt it t i t i ijt yR P R P H X H C T A T β ββ ϕ ϕα α α λ ε =+ + + + + + + + +  
ijt y  is an indicator for whether child j works at time t.  Though the focus of the results is on 
participation rather than hours because of the data problems discussed above,  ijt y  is at times 
hours worked in various types of work.  When  ijt y  refers to a participation variable, (6) is a 
linear probability model.   it RP  is the natural logarithm of the real price of a kilogram of ordinary 
rice, and  * it jt RPH  is the interaction of the natural logarithm of the rice price with one of the 
various measures of sibling or household composition that are considered below.  All regressions 
also control for differences in child labor supply associated with the various household and 
sibling composition measures.  Thus, the effect on child labor supply of various household and 
sibling measures is  22 it RP β ϕ +  and thus depends on the rice price in the community.  By and 
large, the discussion below focuses on  2 β , or how the effect of rice prices on child labor various 
with household and sibling composition rather than on the effect of changes in household 
composition on child labor. 
  (6) also includes several controls for factors associated with rice price changes and child 
labor.  The vector Xjt captures personal characteristics.  Labor supply might differ across people 
because of differences in gender and age.  Gender and age differences are captured using a third 
order polynomial in person's age, a gender (male) indicator, and an interaction of the gender 
effect with all terms of the age polynomial.  Tt is a year indicator,  i λ is a commune fixed effect 
that controls for time-invariant community attributes, and Cit is a vector of time-varying 
community characteristics such as season of interview and whether rice production or planting is   24
on-going at the time of the interview.   i A  is a vector of time-invariant community characteristics 
such as region indicators and commune accessibility indicators interacted with time to allow 
different time trends in labor supply associated with these community traits.  Commune 
accessibility and region indicators cannot be included without year interactions, because the 
commune fixed effect already captures time-invariant commune characteristics such as the 
region in which the commune is located and commune’s accessibility.  In all regressions, the 
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the level of variation of rice 
prices (psu/survey round). 
4.3 Remaining Conceptual Issues 
  There are four remaining conceptual issues not addressed in the empirical framework that 
should be raised.  The first three issues (migration, attrition, and types of child labor) are dataset 
specific and the fourth issue (endogenous household composition) is more conceptual. 
First, the panel in the VLSS is not an individual panel.  No effort is made to track 
individuals that move out of the household.  The out migration of children will be missed in the 
dataset.  This might raise a problem in the analysis below if children move in or out of 
households because of rice price movements.  Edmonds and Turk (2004) consider how large a 
problem children missing for work might be in VLSS panel households.  They find that at most 
36 out of 6003 children who are 0-10 in the first round of the VLSS may be missing from the 
second round of the VLSS for work reasons.  Thus, at least for children, missed changes in labor 
supply owing to migration are not likely to significantly distort the results below. 
Second, the VLSS does not track households that move.  Thus, if rice price increases 
affect household movements and thereby child labor, this type of dynamic is missed entirely.  
Mobility restrictions in Vietnam are rather severe, so this data limitation is not as much of a   25
problem as one might fear.  Moreover, the present study is not based on panel households but 
rather panel communes.  Within a commune, the set of households is random.  Hence, individual 
household attrition is not a concern, but changes through time in the types of households within a 
community would be a concern.  A similar concern is that a household survey in general does not 
observe homeless individuals and street children.  Thus, the data will miss any effect of rice price 
movements on homelessness or the incidence of street children. 
  Third, many forms of child labor are not captured by the VLSS.  In the extreme, some of 
the most exploitative forms of child labor, such as child prostitution, are likely to be hidden 
because they are illegal.  One could imagine that improvements in household income may 
increase demand for some illegal activities but decrease the household's willingness to supply 
children for these activities.  Thus, there is scope for a link between rice price increases and the 
worst forms of child labor although it is not clear what direction the link goes.  Even within 
activities that are captured in the VLSS, there is no information on working conditions.  This 
may be substantive if, for example, the declines in child labor that come with rice price increases 
result from households substituting mechanical or chemical inputs for child time.  A child may 
be better off working 20 hours a week hand-weeding than 5 hours a week spreading pesticides 
and fertilizers without protection.  Thus, the conditions of working children could deteriorate as a 
result of rice price increases in tandem with declines in child labor.  There is simply no available 
data to evaluate whether this happens. 
  Fourth, endogenous household composition may substantively affect the conclusions of 
this study.  As discussed in the previous section, if one could assume that household composition 
was fixed and exogenous to price changes, then it would be possible to separately identify 
income and substitution effects with the available data.  However, this is a strong assumption.    26
As such, the data can only inform about reduced form effects of rice prices on child labor.  A 
second implication of endogenous household composition is that conditioning on control 
variables such as the number of persons of a certain age in the household may capture some of 
the effect of rice prices on child labor.  That is, say rice prices increases cause households to 
increase the number of young adults in the household.  Moreover, assume that increasing the 
number of young adults in the household lowers child labor, because young adults are better 
workers than children.  Then, conditioning on the number of young adults in the household 
actually captures some of the way that rice prices affect child labor supply, attenuating the 
estimated effect of rice prices in the data.   
  While this scenario suggests an attenuation of the observed effects of rice prices, 
endogenous household composition could also inflate estimates of the effect of rice price 
increases.  For example, say that rice price increases enable households to overcome liquidity 
constraints and send children away to better schools.  Then, the remaining children may be the 
less productive children if productivity in school and productivity on the farm are correlated.  
Less productive children may be less likely to work.  Thus, there will appear to be a decline in 
child labor even though the observed children have not changed their labor supply.  Moreover, 
the interactions of household composition with rice prices may appear significant if households 
adjust their composition by bringing in other workers to substitute for the children sent away to 
school.   
  It is difficult to measure how important these shifts in household composition are in the 
data, but the data do not support the assertion that there are large, substantive shifts in household 
composition.  First, , in table 1, it is evident that generally speaking, aside from the decline in 
young children, there are not large changes in household composition.  This is especially true for   27
the adult population.  Second, most of the latent factors associated with child labor and changes 
in household composition should be captured by controlling for household composition.  The set 
of cases where changes in household composition associated with changes in child labor vary 
with rice prices continuously is much smaller.  In addition, these shifts in household composition 
are likely of second order to the large income and substitution effects associated with rice price 
increases observed in Edmonds and Pavcnik (2003a).  Even in cases where households receive 
dramatic increases in income, changes in household composition are relatively minor and require 
extremely large data sets to identify (see Edmonds, Mammen, and Miller (2002) for discussion).  
In the present case, regressions of all of the various household composition measures used in this 
study on rice prices and the other controls described in (6) reject the hypothesis that there are 
changes in household composition with rice price increases in every case except for the number 
of persons in the household above the age of 65.  Thus, endogenous household composition 
represents a potential problem in interpreting the results of the next section, but the available 
evidence does not suggest this problem is of first-order concern. 
5. Results 
  This section examines in the VLSS data how the relationship between child labor and rice 
prices varies with household and sibling composition.  A number of studies have examined the 
relationship between various measures of child labor and rice price changes in this dataset (e.g. 
Edmonds and Pavcnik 2003a, 2003b, and 2003c), so the focus of the present discussion is purely 
on how the relationship varies based on who resides with children 6-15.  The basic finding is that 
household composition attributes that cause children to work more given rice prices are 
associated with larger declines in child labor.  Two interesting exceptions to this general finding 
are in the data.  First, the presence of younger children (0-5) and younger siblings are associated   28
with higher levels of own-farm work and smaller declines in own-farm work with rice price 
increases.  Second, the addition of young adults (16-24) lowers the amount of work performed 
by children 6-15 given rice prices and increases the decline in work associated with rice price 
increases.  Both of these exceptions to the general finding of a positive correlation between 
initial levels of work and declines in work are consistent with the view that older siblings play a 
supportive role for their younger siblings. 
5.1 Household Composition 
  The framework of section 2 gives two reasons for the effect of rice prices on child labor 
to depend on household composition.  First, household members differ in the value of their 
marginal product.  Second, the household may perceive different marginal disutility of work 
across children.  These two factors imply that income and substitution effects of price changes 
may vary across members, because the relative (shadow) prices of different forms of labor vary 
within the household.  A third reason (not modeled) that the effect of rice prices on child labor 
supply may depend on household composition is that the household's decision-making process 
may depend on who is resident in the household (e.g. Foster 1999) especially if household 
members benefit from rice price increases differently (e.g. Thomas 1994).  This section begins 
the empirical analysis by considering how the response of child labor supply to rice price 
changes varies with household composition.   
  Table 4 allows the effect of rice price increases to vary with household size (in column 1) 
and counts of the number of persons in the household in various age groups (remaining 
columns).  The sample in table 4 and throughout the remainder of this paper is limited to children 
ages 6-15 in rural households in communes visited in both rounds of the VLSS.
2  In the first two 
                                                 
2 In addition, table 4 restricts the sample to children in households with between 3 and 15 members.  In practice this 
eliminates 3 households with more than 20 members and households that consist of only a parent and a child.   29
columns of table 4, the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the child is active 
(participates in market work or household production for at least 7 hours in the last week).  In 
columns 3-8, the dependent variable is the hours worked per week in market work (4 and 7), 
household production (5 and 8), and combined (3 and 6).  Columns 3-5 are OLS regressions 
while columns 6-8 contain results from a Tobit specification.  Because the Tobit and OLS results 
are similar, the discussion focuses on the OLS results.  Only OLS results are presented in the 
remainder of the paper. 
 Interpreting  the  results for participation in table 4 requires an understanding of how child 
labor supply varies with household composition in 1993 after controlling for variation in child 
labor associated with all of the regression controls in table 4.  The coefficient on a non-interacted 
household composition variable is the relationship between the household composition variable 
and child labor when the log rice price is zero.  The average change in child labor associated 
with the addition of a person in a given age group is computed by adding the regression 
coefficient in table 4 for that age group to the product of the coefficient on the interaction of that 
age group total with the mean log of rice prices (1.05 is the mean log rice price in the pooled 
1993 and 1998 data).  That is, based on column 2, the average change in the probability that a 
child is active with the addition of a person between the ages of 0 and 5 is 0.095-0.48*1.05, or 
each additional child 0-5 increases the probability that a child 6-15 is active by 4 percentage 
points.  By any of the measures in table 4 (i.e. in each column of table 4), child labor is higher 
when there are more children 0-5 present and lower when there are more young adults (16-24) or 
prime age adults (25-64) present.  With elders (age 65 plus) and persons in the same age category 
(6-15), more household members in each group is associated with reduced time in household   30
work and a reduced probability that a child 6-15 is active.  However, more same-age children 
and more elders are associated with greater participation in market work. 
  With this baseline perspective, it is possible to interpret how the relationship between 
child labor and rice prices varies with household composition.  In general, the main finding in 
table 4 is that household composition attributes that are associated with less child labor lead to 
smaller changes in child labor with rice price increases and attributes associated with more child 
labor lead to larger reductions in child labor.  For example, each additional prime age adult (25-
64) diminishes the decline in the probability that a child is active with a rice price increase by 3 
percentage points (column 2, this is not statistically different than zero) and mitigates the decline 
in hours in household work with a rice price increase by 1.7 hours (column 5, this is statistically 
significant).  The results of adding an elder (65 plus) are similar in sign to that of adding a prime-
age adult although they are larger in magnitude and statistically significant in activity (column 2) 
and household work (column 5).  The attenuating effect of the presence of elders on the 
association between rice prices and child labor may reflect that elders are able to carry more of 
the household production burden than prime age adults, because elders have diminished 
obligations to other types of market work as a result of age. 
  The change in the relationship between child labor and rice prices associated with adding 
an additional child 0-5 has the opposite sign of the changes associated with adding a prime age 
adult or elder.  Each additional child 0-5 raises the decline in the probability that a child is active 
with rice price increases by 5 percentage points (column 1, not statistically significant) and 
increases the decline in hours in household production by 1.9 hours (column 5, statistically 
significant).  This finding that an increase in children 0-5 accentuates the decline in child labor 
(in columns 2,3,5,6,and 8) for children 6-15 reflects the fact that the presence of a younger child   31
is associated with an increase in the probability that a child 6-15 is active and increases the hours 
worked in household production.  One exception to this finding that the presence of a young 
child increases the decline in child associated with rice price increases (albeit a statistically 
insignificant results) is that children 6-15 spend more hours in market work with rice price 
increases. 
  The more surprising result in table 4 is for the number of persons ages 16 to 24.  Each 
person age 16 to 24 in the household increases the decline in activity with rice price increases by 
5 percentage points (column 2, statistically significant) and the decline in total hours worked by 
1.6 hours (column 3, statistically significant).  That is, consider the thought experiment of 
switching a household member from age 6 to 15 to age 16 to 24.  This increases the effect of rice 
prices on the probability that a child is active by 8 percentage points or approximately 30 percent 
(evaluated at the 1998 mean of all household composition variables – table 1, column 7).
3  This 
though experiment also is associated an additional decline in total hours worked in the last week 
with rice price increases that is almost 2 hours per week larger.  This also corresponds to a 30 
percent increase in the magnitude of the effect of rice price increases.  This result is surprising, 
because the presence of a young adult in the household is associated with lower participation 
rates for children 6 to 15.  That is, the addition of a young adult to the household lowers the 
incidence of most types of child labor and increases the decline in most types of child labor 
associated with rice price increases.  For this to occur within the model of section 2, the disutility 
                                                 
3 To estimate the thought experiment of keeping household size fixed but moving one household member from one 
demographic group to another, the marginal effect of a change in rice prices needs to computed for a baseline group.  
In the present case, the baseline group is given by the study sample means in 1998.  To compute the marginal effect 
of a change in rice prices at the 1998 study sample means on the probability that a child is active, multiply the 
coefficients on the interaction terms in column 2 of table 4 by their respective means from column 7 of table 1.  Sum 
these interactions together, adding the regression coefficient on rice prices in the first row that is not interacted with 
any demographic group.  This gives a marginal effect of a change in log rice prices of -0.26 (a 30 percent increase in 
rice prices is associated with an 8 percentage point decline in the probability that a child 6-15 is active).  The 
thought experiment then subtracts one child 6-15 (-.031) and adds one young adult 16-24 (-.05).  The new marginal 
effect of a change in log rice prices is -0.34, or 30 percent of the baseline marginal effect.   32
associated with having a child work needs to be steeper in the relevant ranges than the disutility 
associated with  having the young adult work.  This would enable the young adult's child labor to 
decline with an increase in rice prices but for the child's labor to have to decline proportionally 
more to maintain equilibrium. 
  Table 5 looks into what types of activities are changing in greater depth.  Columns 1-5 
consider participation in wage work, within household work, own-farm work, home enterprises, 
and household production respectively.  Columns 6-9 consider total hours worked in wage work, 
within household work, within household agriculture, and within household home enterprises.  
The results for total hours, market work hours, and household production hours are in table 4 and 
have already been discussed.  Table 5 is useful to identify what types of changes in work are 
behind the patterns observed in table 4. 
  The finding that increases in young children (0-5) are associated with smaller declines in 
hours worked in market work when rice price increases seems to be driven by increased 
participation in own farm work (column 3 of table 5).  Evaluated at the 1998 means (see footnote 
3), the marginal effect of a change in rice prices on the probability that a child participates in 
own farm agriculture is 0.004.  However, if the thought experiment is performed of moving one 
resident from age group 6-15 to age group 0-5, then the marginal effect of an increase in rice 
prices on the probability that a child 6-15 participates in own farm agriculture is 0.024.  That is a 
530 percent increase in the marginal effect of a change in rice prices based on changing a child's 
age from the 6-15 range to the 0-5 range.  Overall, though, increases in the number of children 0-
5 increase the magnitude of the decline in the probability that a child 6-15 is active (column 2 of 
table 4) when rice prices increases and lowers the total hours worked by a child (column 3 of 
table 4) by more when rice prices increase although neither of these findings is statistically   33
significant.  The larger decline in hours in household production with the addition of a child 0-5 
is statistically significant in table 4 (column 5 of table 4), and table 5 illustrates that this decline 
in household production shows up as a decline in total hours worked within the household 
(column 7) and in part reflects declines in participation in home production (column 5). 
  The finding that increases in the number of young adults (16-24) are associated with 
larger declines in child labor for children 6-15 with rice price increases appears to be driven 
largely changes in participation in within household work and declines in hours worked in wage 
work, home enterprise work, and home production.  In column 2 of table 5, the addition of a 
person 16-24 increases the decline in within household work that accompanies increased rice 
prices by 5 percentage points.  This decline in participation in within household work appears to 
largely be in household production (column 5) even thought the household production coefficient 
is not statistically significant.  The additional decline in hours worked (table 4, column 3) seems 
surprisingly evenly distributed across wage work (table 5 – column 6), work in a home enterprise 
(table 5 – column 9), and home production (table 4 – column 5).  There is also an extra decline 
with an additional person 16-24 in hours in own farm agriculture although it is smaller in 
magnitude than in the other types of work.  Table 5 does not appear to be particularly 
informative in the types of activities through which additional prime age adults or elders affect 
smaller declines in most categories in child labor other than the fact that both groups are 
associated with lower overall participation rates and hours.  
  Table 6 considers whether there are gender differences in the basic findings of how the 
relationship between rice prices and child labor varies with household composition.   The first 4 
columns in table 6 contain the results of restricting the sample to only girls and the last 4 
columns restrict the sample to only boys.  The dependent variables (columns) are identical to   34
columns 2-5 in table 4.  The observation that additional prime age adults and elders are 
associated with small changes with rice price increases seems to be roughly true in both boys and 
girls. However, the finding that the addition of young adults leads to larger declines in child 
labor with rice price increases appears to be entirely a girl phenomena.  The patterns observed in 
boys are similar to that observed in girls, but the magnitudes of the coefficients for boys are 
substantially smaller.  The patterns observed in the changes in the response of child activities to 
rice price increases with additional young children appears for both boys and girls although they 
are all statistically insignificant when the data are  bifurcated as in table 6.  Interestingly, the 
observation that increased young children 0-5 leads to smaller declines in hours in market work 
with rice price increases seems to be primarily concentrated in girls although the data do not 
reject the hypothesis that the gender differences in the coefficients on young children 0-5 and 
rice prices are in fact zero. 
  In summary, the data suggest that household composition measures that are associated 
with less child labor are generally associated with smaller declines in child labor as markets 
integrate.  Equivalently, the largest declines in child labor with market integration are in children 
who work the most.  There are two interesting exceptions to this finding.  First, children 6-15 
work less in the presence of young adults 16-24, but they also experience larger declines in child 
labor when rice prices increase.  Second, children 6-15 work more in the presence of young 
children 0-5, and as is typical, children 6-15 experience larger declines in most types of work 
with rice price increases if there are more children 0-5 in the household.  However, the 
interesting anomaly is that the presence of additional children 0-5 is associated with increases in 
own farm work with rice price increases for children 6-15.  These two anomalies appear to be 
most important in the labor supply of girls 6-15 rather than boys.  They highlight the supportive   35
role older children, especially older girls, can play in the household.  The next section considers 
sibling interactions explicitly. 
5.2 Sibling Composition 
  The model of section 2 is one in which the effects of rice prices vary with the available 
substitutes for a child's labor in the household, because a child's relative productivity coupled 
with the household's marginal disutility of work affects how much the child works in the 
household.  This section considers how the effect of rice prices on a child's labor varies with the 
number sibling in the household and the gender of these children. 
  There is a large literature that argues that sibling sex composition may influence 
investments in children, and Edmonds (2002) finds evidence of a link between sibling gender 
composition and child labor supply in Nepal.  Edmonds contends that differences in comparative 
advantage in child labor between genders can lead to sibling sex composition effects on child 
labor.  Rose (2000) argues that parental preferences for boys in India cause the investment of 
parental time in a child to depend on sibling sex composition.  Garg and Morduch (1998) as well 
as Morduch (2000) find in Ghana and Tanzania that in the presence of liquidity constraints, 
investments in children will be lower with more boys in a household, because boys require more 
financial resources.  Butcher and Case (1994) argue that peer effects are responsible for sibling 
sex composition effects that they find in the U.S.  That is, girls with many brothers grow up in a 
more masculine environment. 
  A sibling for this paper is defined as s co-resident person of any age who shares at least 
one parent in common.  A great deal of attention in academic research on southeast Asia has 
been placed on the responsibilities of the oldest child in the household (see Desai 1999 for 
discussion in the Vietnamese context).  Hence, the empirical work begins by considering   36
whether the oldest child is affected by rice prices differently than other child, then turn to a more 
general specification.  Necessarily, to consider sibling composition, the dataset is limited to 
children with siblings.   
  The regression approach is to amend (6) to allow rice price effects to vary with an 
indicator for if a child 6-15 is the oldest sibling.  Conditional on being the oldest child, the 
interpretation of the interaction of rice prices with the oldest child indicator is the change in the 
effect of rice prices on child labor associated that the oldest child experiences.  Table 7 mirrors 
the format of table 6 and considers whether the oldest child responds differently to changes in 
rice prices. 
  Oldest children work more than their siblings even after controlling for the fact that they 
are older.  This is true for both boys and girls.  However, the data do not reject the hypothesis 
that the eldest girls' activities change in the same manner as do her siblings when rice prices 
change.  For boys, the story is different.  Being an eldest boy nearly doubles the decline in the 
probability that a child is active when rice prices increase.  The decline in total hours worked is 
similarly large and occurs in both market and household work although the estimated coefficient 
for market work is slightly larger (market work and household work hours are individually 
statistically insignificant).  There is no obvious explanation in the theory of section 2 why eldest 
boys should respond to rice prices so much more than other children in the household.  One 
possibility is that parental preferences to the eldest boy are in someway special so that the 
disutility from having the eldest boy work is very high.  Thus, households are quick to translate 
additional income from rice price increases into declines in the economic activities of the eldest 
boy, more so than elder girls for whom work may be more acceptable.   37
  It seems likely that the consequence of being an older child depends in part on the 
composition of your sibling cohort.  Thus, table 8 considers how the relationship between rice 
prices and child labor varies with sibling composition.  There are 2 panels in table 8 that indicate 
an entirely distinct set of regressions.  In the top panel, the effect of rice prices on child labor is 
allowed to vary with the number of siblings.  In the bottom panel, the effect of rice prices is 
allowed to vary with the number of siblings, the number of younger siblings, and the number of 
younger siblings that are male.  Each column in table 8 contains the same dependent variable, 
indicated at the top of the column and defined in the discussion of table 2.  Columns 1-4 of table 
8 contain results for girls and columns 5-8 refer to boys.   Columns 1 and 5 consider changes in 
whether a child is defined as active.  Columns 2-4 (and similarly 5-8) contain hours worked in 
total, market, and household work respectively.  As with each panel, each column is from a 
distinct regression.  Thus, there are sixteen distinct regressions reported in table 8. 
  For both boys and girls, the data never reject the hypothesis that the effect of rice prices 
on child labor does not vary with the number of siblings.  This mirrors the finding for household 
size in table 4 and may stem from any number of reasons.  For example, older siblings may 
reduce a child's need to work while younger siblings may increase a child's need to work.  On 
average, these two effects offset so that there does not appear to be an impact of the number of 
siblings on whether the child is active or how many hours the child works.  This example 
suggests looking at the composition of siblings rather than just their number.  Hence, the 
remainder of this section focuses on the approach in the bottom panel of table 8 that allows effect 
of rice prices to vary with the number of siblings, the number of younger siblings, and the 
number of younger male siblings.   38
  Interpreting the regression coefficients on each of these sibling variables is somewhat 
tricky, because adding a younger male siblings also adds a younger sibling which also adds a 
sibling.  That is, the change in the effect of rice prices on child labor of adding a younger male 
sibling is the sum of the coefficient on the younger male sibling interaction term, the younger 
sibling interaction term, and the sibling interaction term.  The change in the effect of rice prices 
on child labor of adding a younger female sibling is the sum of the coefficients on the younger 
sibling interaction term and the sibling interaction term.  This highlights the main advantage of 
this specification: the resulting interpretation of each regression coefficient.  The interpretation 
of the interaction with number of younger siblings is given the number of siblings, if a sibling is 
switched from older to younger than the reference child, how does the response of the child's 
labor supply to rice prices change.  Similarly, the interpretation of the number of younger 
brothers interaction is the thought experiment of changing a younger sibling from a sister to a 
brother.  The interpretation of the coefficient on the sibling variable is the change in the marginal 
effect of rice price increases on child labor of adding a sibling who is older.   
  As with household composition, it is first necessary to understand the link between child 
labor and sibling composition given rice prices.  These statistics are computed at the mean of the 
log rice price (1.05).  For both boys and girls, adding an older sibling decreases the probability 
that a child is active and the number of hours worked in household production and market work 
decline.  At the mean of log rice prices (1.05), adding an older sibling decreases the probability 
that a child reports being active by 3 percentage points for both boys and girls and decreases total 
hours work by 1 hour per week for girls and 1/2 an hour per week for boys.  In the thought 
experiment of converting a sibling from older to younger than the reference child, the amount of 
work performed by both boys and girls increases.  Increases are slightly larger for girls than for   39
boys.  For both boys and girls, most of the increase in hours worked is in household production.  
In the thought experiment of converting the younger child from a girl to a boy, both boys and 
girls increase their work even more.  The largest changes are in market work for boys and 
household production for girls. 
  Columns 1 and 3 of Table 8 mimic the table 6 regressions but interacting rice prices with 
the number of siblings rather than children.  Sibling results appear similar to the results for 
children. 
  An obvious question in the eldest child results is whether the difference experienced by 
the eldest child is mirrored throughout the sibling order.  This is examined in table 8 by 
interacting rice prices with the number of siblings, the number of younger siblings, and the 
number of younger brothers.  Thus,Column 2 looks at participation in child labor.   Column 4 
looks at participation without any schooling, and columns 5-7 look at hours worked in total, 
market, and household work in the last 7 days. 
  For both boys and girls, an increase in the number of siblings has little effect on how the 
probability that a child works declines with rice price increases.  However, adding a sibling 
attenuates the increase in girls that only work associated with rice price increases.  For both boys 
and girls, switching a sibling from an older sibling to a younger sibling, increases the effects of 
rice prices.  This appears to be because child labor is higher when there are more younger 
siblings.  Thus, there are greater reductions that can be affected by rice price increases.  In 
general the increasing effects of rice prices with relatively younger siblings are only statistically 
significant for girls, but the estimates of the magnitude of the change in rice price effects with 
adding younger siblings appears similar for both boys and girls.   40
  While younger siblings increase the decline in participation in child labor associated with 
rice price increases, a change in the gender mix of those younger siblings towards boys actually 
mitigates the effects of adding younger siblings for girls.  For boys the net effect is still a larger 
decline in child labor with additional siblings, but younger brothers mitigate the effects of rice 
prices while younger sisters increase the effects of rice prices.  This rather odd result appears to 
be because the child labor participation of girls is lower in the presence of younger brothers than 
it is in the presence of younger sisters.  In examining hours worked, it appears that this lower 
participation rate of girls is because adding younger brothers lowers the time that girls (and boys) 
spend in market work.  One possible explanation for this is that perhaps younger brothers are 
better own-farm workers than are girls.  Thus, the presence of younger brothers lowers the 
household's labor demand for girls in market work. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  This study has considered how the response of child labor supply to product market 
integration varies with the child's household and sibling composition.  A simple theoretical 
model illustrates that the response of child labor supply to product market integration should 
depend on household and sibling composition.  In general, the household allocates child labor so 
that the relatively more productive children work more.  More productive children experience 
larger swings in child labor supply with relative price increases.  If child labor declines with 
price increases, then more productive children experience large declines.  If child labor increases 
with price increases, then more productive children experience larger increases. 
  The empirical findings are broadly consistent with this theoretical result.  In general, rice 
price increases are associated with declines in child labor in Vietnam.  Theoretically, this   41
suggests a positive income effect to rice producing households, a substitution effect away from 
rice toward child leisure, and a substitution effect away from children in the production of rice.  
Older children are relatively more productive within the household, and older children work 
more in the absence of price increases.  In most cases, these older children experience larger 
declines in child labor than their younger siblings with increases in rice prices, even after 
controlling for differences in child labor associated with age. 
  This study finds that adding a child or a sibling to a household does not have a clear 
effect on how a given child's labor supply responds to rice price increases.  This appears to be 
because a child's response to the addition of a co-resident child or sibling depends on that child's 
relative productivity.  If the additional child is older than the reference child, then the reference 
child's labor is lower as a result of the presence of the older, more productive child.  Because the 
reference child's initial labor supply is lower, rice price increases lead to a smaller decline in 
child labor.  The converse appears to be true for the addition of a younger child.  That is, when 
the reference child is older, the addition of a younger sibling increases the reference child's initial 
labor supply and thereby the reference child experiences a larger decline in child labor with rice 
price increases.  These two responses to the addition of a child or sibling offset each other so that 
the net effect of adding a co-resident child or sibling is zero on average. 
  This reason for no effect on child labor participation of adding a sibling highlights a main 
finding of this paper: there are large differences in how child labor responds to rice prices 
associated with whether the reference child's cohort of siblings is relatively younger or older.  
The greater the fraction of siblings that are younger, the more the reference child works and 
therefore the larger the reduction in child labor with rice price increases for the reference child.  
These results are particularly large for the eldest child.  Eldest siblings work substantially more   42
than younger siblings and experience much larger declines in child labor with rice price 
increases.  The effects of rice prices on the eldest child are particularly dramatic for the eldest 
boy.  Girls generally work more than boys and generally experience larger declines in child labor 
with rice price increases.  However, if the eldest child is a boy, he appears to bear a greater work 
burden than the standard boy.  Thus, with an increase in rice prices, he experiences the largest 
declines in child labor supply. 
  The results for child labor overall differ slightly from those for working and not attending 
school (child labor only).  Vietnam has among the shortest school days in the developing world, 
so school and work are often compatible.  There is some concern, however, that children that 
work and do not attend school are somehow bearing a greater cost than children that work and 
attend school.  Girls are more likely to work and not attend school, and their propensity to do this 
appears to depend on the number of siblings.  In considering hours worked, it looks like girls 
spend more time in household production when there are more children in the household (even if 
the children are older or younger).  This, then, leads to a lower probability of participating in 
schooling while working.  However, with rice price increases, these girls experience larger 
declines in child labor supply with the number of siblings in the household.  The effect of rice 
price increases is further magnified if these siblings are younger siblings.  Hence, for girls, both 
sibling age composition and sibling cohort size appear to be important in how the probability a 
child works without attending school responds to rice price increases. 
  Overall, then, this study has found that children who work more experience larger 
declines in child labor.  Household and sibling composition variables associated with differences 
in child labor are then associated with differences in declines in child labor.  Thus, differences 
between siblings in child labor are elastic with respect to the household's environment.  Customs   43
and social norms may produce the observed differences between siblings in productivity or the 
household's willingness to let a child work.  However, the results of this study suggest that 
economic factors such as the relative price changes studied here can work to mitigate sibling 
differences.  This may have implications for the long-term persistence of sibling differences in 
the development process. 
  There is one interesting result where children that work more are not the ones 
experiencing the largest declines in child labor.  Namely, children work less in the presence of 
young adults ages 16 to 24.  Yet, children 6 to 15 experience larger reductions in child labor 
supply with increases in rice prices if there are more young adults 16 to 24 present.  Edmonds 
and Pavcnik (2003b) find net declines in the labor supply of young adults with rice price 
increases, but the results in the present paper suggest that part of what must be occurring is that 
the households are also substituting some additional work of persons 16 to 24 for child labor.  
This might occur within the framework of section 2 if the household perceives a different 
disutility of work for children than it does for young adults. 
  Overall, then the results of this study are consistent with a general convergence of labor 
supply between children with product market integration.  In fact, the broader data suggest child 
labor supply is converging within the household in Vietnam.  49 percent of the variation in child 
labor is within household in 1993 while only 38 percent is within household in 1998.  Thus, 
variation in child labor between co-resident children declines by 22 percent.  The convergence in 
co-resident variation in child labor that is attributable to rice prices occurs, because the net effect 
of all of the substitution and income effects associated with market integration in this context are 
toward a decline in child labor.  An obvious question arises about how these results generalize.  
First, for reasons discussed in Edmonds and Pavcnik (2002c), the sign of the effect of market   44
integration on child labor may be unique to the present case where most households are well-
positioned to benefit from an increase in the relative price of rice.  Second, it could be the case 
that ethnic traditions and social norms are weaker in Vietnam than in other countries where they 
are believed to be important.  Thus, economic factors have a greater ability to influence sibling 
differences in child labor in Vietnam than elsewhere. 
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1993 1998 1993 1998
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8
mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e.
HH variables
# Sample Households 4799 5999 2255 2375
# Communes (PSU) 150 194 115 115
Household Size 5.91 0.09 5.48 0.06 6.55 0.11 5.95 0.08
# Persons 0-5 0.87 0.03 0.57 0.02 0.88 0.04 0.56 0.03
# Persons 6-15 1.61 0.04 1.46 0.04 2.34 0.03 2.14 0.04
# Persons 16-24 1.05 0.03 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.04 0.93 0.04
# Persons 25-64 2.11 0.04 2.12 0.02 2.09 0.03 2.09 0.02
# Persons 65+ 0.28 0.01 0.33 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.24 0.01
Variables for Children 6-15
Mother Present 0.96 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.97 0.00
Father Present 0.88 0.01 0.91 0.01 0.89 0.01 0.92 0.01
Both Parents Present 0.87 0.01 0.89 0.01 0.88 0.01 0.90 0.01
# Co-Resident Siblings 3.17 0.07 2.63 0.07 3.30 0.07 2.71 0.08
Fraction Brothers 0.50 0.01 0.51 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.51 0.01
Fraction Younger 0.48 0.01 0.45 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.45 0.01
All means are weighted to reflect sample design.  All standard errors are corrected for primary sampling unit (psu) clustering.  
The study sample is restricted to rural households with children 6-15 in communes that are visited in both rounds of the VLSS.
Nationally Representative Sample Study SampleTable 2: Activities of Children Aged 6-15
limited to children in rural  households in panel communities
Female Male
1993 1998 1993 1998
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8
mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e.
Participation in Last Seven Days (%)
Wage Work 2.2 0.5 1.4 0.3 1.9 0.4 1.1 0.3
Agriculture 1.5 0.4 0.9 0.3 1.4 0.3 0.7 0.2
Non-Agricultural activities 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.2
Within Household Work 69.0 1.4 64.3 1.9 60.8 1.7 56.6 2.2
Agriculture 30.8 2.0 24.1 2.1 29.3 2.0 23.6 2.4
Household Enterprise 4.9 0.9 2.8 0.7 3.5 0.6 2.8 0.6
Household Production 62.6 1.4 62.7 1.9 47.7 1.7 50.6 2.3
Market Work 35.8 1.8 27.0 2.0 33.4 1.9 26.1 2.4
Any Work 69.4 1.4 64.6 1.9 61.9 1.7 57.2 2.2
Active 63.7 1.5 52.0 2.3 56.3 1.7 45.0 2.5
Hours Worked per Week
Wage Work 0.46 0.10 0.34 0.08 0.44 0.11 0.28 0.06
Agriculture 0.33 0.09 0.22 0.07 0.34 0.09 0.20 0.05
Nonagricultural activities 0.14 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.03
Within Household Work 14.58 0.59 10.63 0.59 11.22 0.56 8.47 0.55
Agriculture 6.17 0.50 4.51 0.47 6.08 0.49 4.35 0.42
Household Enterprise 0.85 0.23 0.46 0.12 0.41 0.09 0.23 0.05
Household Production 7.59 0.25 5.65 0.26 4.73 0.26 3.88 0.27
Market Work 7.48 0.50 5.31 0.45 6.94 0.47 4.86 0.41
Total Hours 15.05 0.60 10.98 0.58 11.67 0.55 8.75 0.53
Sample Size 2370 2287 2481 2456
All means are weighted to reflect sample design and standard errors are corrected for PSU clustering.  Market work includes work for wages, work 
in agriculture within the household, and work in household enterprise.  Because people can paricipate in more than one activity the subcotegories of 
various participation variables do not necessarily add up to participation in wage work, within household work, and overall(any) work.  Active is 
defined as participating in market work or participating in household production for at least 7 hours in the last week. Table 3: Household Composition and Child Labor
limited to children 6-15 in rural  households in panel communities
1993 and 1998 data are combined for this table
Active=1 Active=0
-1 -2 -3 -4
Sample Size 5062 4491
mean s.e. mean s.e. 
Household Size 6.103 0.080 6.187 0.101
# Persons 0-5 0.605 0.035 0.614 0.033
# Persons 6-15 2.570 0.035 2.545 0.040
# Persons 16-24 0.750 0.029 0.762 0.040
# Persons 25-64 1.993 0.011 2.066 0.019
# Persons 65+ 0.187 0.012 0.204 0.013
# Siblings 3.018 0.073 2.968 0.081
# Younger Sibs 1.632 0.053 1.017 0.037
# Younger Brothers 0.840 0.033 0.521 0.023
Active is defined as participating in market work or participating in household 
production for at least 7 hours in the last week.  All means weighted to reflect 
sample design.  Standard errors corrected for psu clustering.Table 4: Household Composition, Rice Prices, and Child Labor
limited to children 6-15 in households with 3-15 members
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8
Dependent Variable: Total Market Household Total Market Household
Rice Price -0.231 -0.345 -9.528 -3.508 -6.013 -7.88 -3.492 -6.326
[0.110]** [0.127]** [3.742]** [3.140] [2.183]** [4.586]* [7.184] [3.107]**
Rice Price * Household Size -0.003
[0.015]
Rice Price * # People 0-5 -0.048 -1.329 0.571 -1.845 -2.682 0.575 -2.958
[0.032] [0.882] [0.633] [0.630]** [1.201]** [1.934] [0.808]**
Rice Price * # People 6-15 0.031 0.245 -0.194 0.383 0.487 0.846 0.504
[0.025] [0.655] [0.524] [0.378] [0.866] [1.375] [0.583]
Rice Price * # People 16-24 -0.05 -1.614 -1.006 -0.597 -2.281 0.274 -1.168
[0.025]** [0.691]** [0.597]* [0.411] [0.893]** [1.394] [0.610]*
Rice Price * # People 25-64 0.03 2.01 0.264 1.744 1.694 -1.567 2.475
[0.047] [1.397] [1.226] [0.834]** [1.770] [2.771] [1.204]**
Rice Price * # People 65+ 0.12 2.031 -0.078 2.104 3.011 -1.796 3.007
[0.046]** [1.386] [1.218] [0.748]** [1.912] [2.971] [1.302]**
Household size -0.007
[0.016]
# People 0-5 0.095 2.388 -0.331 2.673 4.718 0.548 4.458
[0.035]** [0.970]** [0.679] [0.713]** [1.264]** [2.017] [0.852]**
# People 6-15 -0.038 -0.347 0.377 -0.668 -1.094 -0.461 -1.183
[0.027] [0.743] [0.572] [0.432] [0.926] [1.461] [0.624]*
# People 16-24 0.022 0.891 0.918 -0.053 0.852 -0.783 -0.252
[0.028] [0.792] [0.663] [0.462] [0.954] [1.478] [0.651]
# People 25-64 -0.07 -3.15 -0.619 -2.525 -3.457 0.452 -3.761
[0.052] [1.455]** [1.287] [0.943]** [1.868]* [2.900] [1.275]**
# People 65+ -0.145 -2.6 0.095 -2.715 -4.196 1.902 -4.194
[0.051]** [1.569]* [1.404] [0.825]** [2.054]** [3.163] [1.400]**
Observations 9470 9470 9457 9503 9464 9457 9503 9464
R-squared 0.38 0.39 0.44 0.36 0.25
Notes: Each column is a separate regression.  For variable definitions, see text.  Robust standard errors in brackets are corrected for psu-time 
clustering.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.  All regressions include commune fixed effects, third order polynomial in age, a gender 
indicator, interactions of the gender dummy with all of the terms of the age polynomial, a year effect, interaction of the year effect with regions, 
interaction of commune accessibility with year, controls for the season of interview and whether the interview is at a rice harvest or planting 
time.  The number of observations are smaller in the hours worked columns because of missing data.  Some observations with missing hours can 
be recovered in participation (cols 1-2) when participation in one of the types of work is positive.  See table 2 for description of dependent 
variables.
Active
Hours Worked  - OLS Hours Worked - Tobit Participation Table 5: Household Composition, Rice Prices, and the type of Activity
limited to children 6-15 in households with 3-15 members
Participation Hours - OLS






















Rice Price 0 0.05 0.053 -0.015 -0.05 -1.639 -7.894 -0.168 -1.704
[0.061] [0.134] [0.129] [0.053] [0.158] [1.748] [3.475]** [2.493] [1.163]
Rice Price * # People 0-5 0.004 -0.06 0.058 0.014 -0.076 0.119 -1.463 0.612 -0.177
[0.009] [0.034]* [0.029]** [0.016] [0.037]** [0.229] [0.851]* [0.647] [0.335]
Rice Price * # People 6-15 0 0.036 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.087 0.138 -0.345 0.044
[0.008] [0.024] [0.021] [0.011] [0.028] [0.207] [0.647] [0.463] [0.189]
Rice Price * # People 16-24 -0.006 -0.048 0.021 -0.006 -0.039 -0.369 -1.246 -0.185 -0.453
[0.009] [0.026]* [0.023] [0.014] [0.030] [0.286] [0.642]* [0.522] [0.261]*
Rice Price * # People 25-64 -0.01 -0.012 -0.046 -0.021 0.09 0.77 1.272 -0.853 0.381
[0.028] [0.054] [0.043] [0.019] [0.062] [0.721] [1.229] [1.092] [0.398]
Rice Price * # People 65+ 0.003 0.045 -0.064 0.041 0.033 0.385 1.609 -1.579 1.081
[0.012] [0.046] [0.042] [0.025] [0.046] [0.378] [1.424] [1.198] [0.465]**
# People 0-5 -0.001 0.099 -0.046 -0.017 0.116 -0.076 2.483 -0.36 0.127
[0.011] [0.037]** [0.031] [0.018] [0.040]** [0.261] [0.935]** [0.704] [0.386]
# People 6-15 -0.001 -0.052 0.008 -0.002 -0.024 -0.1 -0.221 0.527 -0.024
[0.009] [0.026]** [0.023] [0.013] [0.030] [0.228] [0.729] [0.503] [0.220]
# People 16-24 0.007 0.01 -0.03 0.002 -0.018 0.354 0.54 0.123 0.445
[0.011] [0.030] [0.025] [0.016] [0.033] [0.322] [0.739] [0.573] [0.309]
# People 25-64 0.004 -0.011 0.05 0.011 -0.127 -1.135 -2.044 1.065 -0.579
[0.032] [0.060] [0.048] [0.020] [0.069]* [0.816] [1.249] [1.134] [0.421]
# People 65+ -0.009 -0.075 0.079 -0.047 -0.068 -0.582 -1.981 1.96 -1.248
[0.014] [0.050] [0.047]* [0.029]* [0.052] [0.433] [1.604] [1.383] [0.528]**
Observations 9510 9510 9510 9510 9465 9503 9457 9503 9503
R-squared 0.07 0.39 0.35 0.12 0.32 0.07 0.44 0.36 0.1
See notes to table 4 for other notes about the regressions.  See table 2 for description of dependent variables.  Robust standard errors in brackets are 
corrected for psu-time clustering.   * significant at 10%.  ** Significant at 5%.Table 6: Household Composition, Rice Prices, and Child Labor by Gender
limited to children 6-15 in households with 3-15 members
Girls Boys
Participation Participation
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8
Dependent Variable: Active Total Market Household Active Total Market Household
Rice Price -0.281 -14.144 -7.045 -7.294 -0.399 -5.222 -0.121 -4.909
[0.161]* [5.044]** [3.624]* [3.203]** [0.167]** [4.683] [4.305] [2.568]*
Rice Price * # People 0-5 -0.026 -0.22 1.21 -1.235 -0.064 -1.855 0.253 -2.172
[0.042] [1.307] [0.919] [1.009] [0.044] [1.164] [1.039] [0.657]**
Rice Price * # People 6-15 0.014 0.793 -0.036 0.753 0.05 0.007 -0.239 0.182
[0.033] [0.915] [0.690] [0.604] [0.032] [0.775] [0.614] [0.446]
Rice Price * # People 16-24 -0.078 -2.139 -1.345 -0.779 -0.017 -1.017 -0.739 -0.281
[0.033]** [0.881]** [0.726]* [0.580] [0.033] [0.943] [0.828] [0.490]
Rice Price * # People 25-64 0.009 2.696 1.103 1.616 0.037 0.875 -0.643 1.521
[0.063] [2.063] [1.507] [1.356] [0.068] [1.844] [1.753] [0.918]*
Rice Price * # People 65+ 0.151 2.296 -0.454 2.713 0.095 2.172 0.463 1.744
[0.064]** [1.792] [1.526] [1.139]** [0.070] [1.783] [1.556] [1.109]
# People 0-5 0.075 1.357 -1.016 2.204 0.109 2.772 0.005 2.82
[0.044]* [1.400] [0.965] [1.119]** [0.048]** [1.294]** [1.134] [0.765]**
# People 6-15 -0.029 -1.135 0.188 -1.242 -0.049 0.102 0.434 -0.273
[0.035] [1.020] [0.755] [0.678]* [0.035] [0.876] [0.675] [0.516]
# People 16-24 0.05 1.502 1.355 0.12 -0.01 0.216 0.542 -0.34
[0.036] [0.983] [0.806]* [0.641] [0.036] [1.045] [0.906] [0.547]
# People 25-64 -0.052 -4.144 -1.601 -2.558 -0.071 -1.712 0.425 -2.134
[0.069] [2.165]* [1.544] [1.534]* [0.073] [1.991] [1.908] [1.027]**
# People 65+ -0.174 -2.972 0.456 -3.408 -0.121 -2.712 -0.521 -2.253
[0.070]** [1.966] [1.692] [1.257]** [0.080] [2.021] [1.772] [1.266]*
Observations 4602 4597 4617 4600 4868 4860 4886 4864
R-squared 0.42 0.47 0.39 0.26 0.38 0.41 0.34 0.23
Columns 1-4 are separate regressions for girls.  Columns 5-8 are separate regressions for boys.  See notes to table 4 for other notes about the 
regressions.  Robust standard errors in brackets are corrected for psu-time clustering. * significant at 10%.  ** Significant at 5%.
Hours Worked (OLS) Hours Worked (OLS)Table 7: Rice Prices and Activities of the Oldest Child
limited to children with siblings in the household
Girls Boys
Participation Participation
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8
Dependent 
Variable: Active Total Market Household Active Total Market Household
Rice Price -0.264 -7.479 -5.206 -2.499 -0.183 -3.106 -1.183 -1.975
[0.086]** [2.729]** [1.757]** [1.707] [0.084]** [2.051] [1.664] [1.311]
RP*Oldest -0.009 -1.046 1.231 -2.159 -0.148 -3.674 -2.053 -1.462
[0.081] [2.622] [2.057] [1.832] [0.071]** [1.940]* [1.698] [1.200]
Oldest 0.129 4.419 -0.55 4.933 0.24 6.092 2.831 3.135
[0.087] [2.884] [2.232] [2.084]** [0.076]** [2.073]** [1.780] [1.321]**
Observation4496 4492 4510 4494 4730 4723 4749 4726
R-squared 0.42 0.47 0.39 0.25 0.37 0.41 0.35 0.22
See notes to table 4 for other notes about the regressions.  Robust standard errors in brackets are corrected for psu-time clustering
* significant at 10%.  ** Significant at 5%.
Hours Worked (OLS) Hours Worked (OLS)Table 8: Rice Prices, Child Labor, and the Presence of Younger Siblings
limited to children with siblings in the household
Girls Boys
Participation Participation
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8
Dependent Variable: Active Total Market Household Active Total Market Household
Rice Price -0.251 -7.227 -3.888 -3.59 -0.215 -2.829 -1.45 -1.276
[0.105]** [3.091]** [2.019]* [2.078]* [0.098]** [2.633] [2.077] [1.526]
RP*# Siblings -0.007 -0.219 -0.351 0.148 -0.001 -0.423 -0.089 -0.376
[0.022] [0.680] [0.467] [0.479] [0.022] [0.640] [0.536] [0.324]
# Siblings -0.005 -0.097 0.378 -0.489 -0.002 0.323 0.189 0.166
[0.023] [0.755] [0.496] [0.542] [0.025] [0.722] [0.589] [0.370]
Observations 4496 4492 4510 4494 4730 4723 4749 4726
R-squared 0.41 0.46 0.39 0.23 0.37 0.41 0.34 0.21
Rice Price -0.254 -6.565 -3.647 -3.188 -0.223 -2.491 -1.144 -1.248
[0.104]** [3.104]** [2.027]* [2.112] [0.099]** [2.674] [2.131] [1.535]
RP*# Siblings 0.003 0.626 0.061 0.572 0.016 0.462 0.453 -0.024
[0.025] [0.722] [0.524] [0.466] [0.026] [0.687] [0.558] [0.370]
RP* # younger sibs -0.083 -2.853 -1.803 -1.045 -0.065 -4.178 -3.021 -1.224
[0.045]* [1.528]* [1.276] [0.961] [0.042] [1.137]** [0.991]** [0.596]**
RP*# young male sibs 0.133 1.206 1.41 -0.142 0.051 3.396 2.856 0.631
[0.057]** [1.815] [1.663] [1.370] [0.054] [1.462]** [1.264]** [0.783]
# siblings -0.036 -1.454 -0.198 -1.272 -0.038 -1.011 -0.547 -0.441
[0.027] [0.799]* [0.562] [0.529]** [0.029] [0.767] [0.614] [0.416]
# younger sibs 0.157 4.385 2.332 2.102 0.121 5.446 3.457 2.063
[0.047]** [1.610]** [1.356]* [1.050]** [0.045]** [1.242]** [1.089]** [0.663]**
# younger male sibs -0.143 -0.905 -1.407 0.401 -0.036 -2.925 -2.412 -0.6
[0.060]** [1.923] [1.778] [1.487] [0.059] [1.586]* [1.390]* [0.883]
Observations 4496 4492 4510 4494 4730 4723 4749 4726
R-squared 0.43 0.48 0.39 0.26 0.38 0.42 0.35 0.22
Top panel and bottom panel are separate regressions.  See notes to table 5 for additional explanation of regressions.  Robust standard errors in 
brackets are corrected for psu-time clustering.  * significant at 10%.  ** Significant at 5%.
Hours Worked (OLS) Hours Worked (OLS)